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If land is titled and transferable, it can be used as collateral against which money can be borrowed. 
The resulting increase in access to credit is usually expected to foster economic growth. We study a 
policy in colonial India that made land less available as collateral for debt. Using a panel dataset for 
Punjab districts from 1890 to 1910, we find that this reduced the availability of mortgage-backed 
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We cannot draw an indictment against half the people of India; and we may be quite sure whether 
we can see it or not, that we and our institutions are in the wrong, and not they. 
Denzil Ibbetson1 
  
1. Introduction      
In the late 19th century the British-Indian government (the Raj) became preoccupied with 
default on debt and the consequent transfer of land in rural India.  In many regions Raj officials 
made the following chain of argument. British rule had created or clarified individual property rights 
in land, which had for the first time made land available as collateral for debt.  Peasants could now 
borrow up to the full value of their land. The Raj had also replaced informal village-based forms of 
dispute resolution with a formal legal system operating outside the village, which favored the lender 
rather than the borrower.  Peasants were spendthrift and naïve, and unable to negotiate the new 
formal courts created by British rule, whereas lenders were predatory and legally savvy.2  Borrowers 
were frequently defaulting, and land was rapidly passing from long-standing resident peasants to 
professional moneylenders who were often either immigrant, of another religion or sometimes both.  
This would lead to social unrest and threaten British rule.  To preserve British rule it was essential 
that one of the links in the chain be broken, even if this meant abandoning cherished notions of 
sanctity of property and contract.3  
The first major legislation motivated by this thinking, the Deccan Agriculturists’ Relief Act 
of 1879 (DARA), was a response to riots in which peasants attacked moneylenders in four districts 
																																								 																				
1 Letter to local governments and administrations from Denzil Ibbetson, officiating secretary to the 
Government of India, October 26, 1895, in India, Selection of Papers on Agricultural Indebtedness and the Restriction 
of the Power to Alienate Interests in Land, vol. 1 (Simla: Government Press, 1898), 450. Ibbetson was quoting 
another official whom he identifies only as “a former Chief Commissioner of the Central Provinces.” 
2 Colonial documents abound with unfavorable characterizations of moneylenders. For example, a former 
Deputy Commissioner referred to moneylenders as “alien exploiters” who were universally regarded as 
“odious” (Government of India 1898, Vol. 3, p. 303).  
3 In 1895 the Government of India wrote to the various provinces of British India asking if restrictions on land 
transfer were warranted. Its accompanying Note on Land Transfer and Agricultural Indebtedness in India pointed 
out that “proposals for the protection of the landed classes from the effects of debt” had been advanced in the 
North-Western Provinces in 1859 and 1872-73, in Punjab in 1870, in the Deccan in the mid-1870s, by the 
Famine Commission of 1879-80, by the Chief Commissioner of Central Provinces in 1874 and 1888, and in 
Burma, Bengal, Ajmer, Coorg, and Madras after 1890 (pp. 1-2). Thus in every major province of India 
proposals to reduce land transfers were being evaluated. 
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of the Bombay Deccan in 1875. DARA took aim at the legal system created by the Raj, believing 
that it left the unsophisticated borrower at the mercy of the lender. DARA favored judicial discretion 
over rules – the judge’s hands were not tied by the written contractual agreement between borrower 
and lender, and he could order repayment in the amount he considered fair.4 DARA was regarded 
as a success in the Bombay Deccan, but officials in the enormous northwestern province of Punjab 
eventually came to consider a measure like this too feeble, a “placebo”.5 They believed a more 
robust intervention was required.  In 1900 the Punjab Land Alienation Act (PLAA) was passed.6 
PLAA targeted the transferability of land itself. Its primary goal was to prevent professional 
moneylenders from acquiring the property of traditional landowners.7 To this end it banned, except 
under some conditions, permanent transfer of land from an owner belonging to an “agricultural 
tribe” to a buyer or creditor who was not from an agricultural tribe. Moreover, a lender who was not 
from an agricultural tribe could no longer seize the land of a defaulting debtor who was from an 
agricultural tribe. 
PLAA has been described as “the greatest single piece of social engineering ever attempted 
in India.8 Restrictions on the transferability of land were not entirely new, but they hitherto been 
enacted mainly in tribal areas which were often geographically and culturally distant from 
mainstream peasant society. In contrast, PLAA applied to a huge and politically important province. 
It made direct restrictions on the transfer of land a respectable part of the policy apparatus of the Raj 
and its influence persists to the present-day.9 There is a substantial literature on the emergence of the 
PLAA, which we discuss, but there is no careful econometric work on two basic questions regarding 
its impact. First, did the PLAA reduce the availability of mortgage-backed credit? Or were borrowers 
																																								 																				
4 See Chaudhary and Swamy (2017) for a more detailed discussion of DARA. 
5 Selection of Papers on Agricultural Indebtedness (1898), volume 2, p. 2. 
6 Punjab Alienation of Land Act (XIII of 1900). 
7 “Moneylenders” could also be shopkeepers or traders. 
8 See Barrier (1907), p. 355.  While this claim may be too strong, PLAA was undoubtedly an important legislation. 
9 To address the problem of suicides by farmers in (Indian) Punjab, Iyer and Arora (2010, p. 284) suggest 
bringing back legislation similar to PLAA.  We briefly discuss PLAA in Pakistan in the conclusion. 
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and lenders able to use various devices to evade the Act, thereby neutralizing it?10  Second, if less 
credit was available, what were the effects on agricultural outcomes and hence productivity? We use 
panel data methods to address these questions, for the first time, so far as we know. 
In addition to its contribution to research on South Asian history, our work provides 
evidence regarding an unusual policy experiment that is relevant to a hypothesis of broad interest.  
The Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto has argued that while poor people are entrepreneurial, 
they lack capital.  Though they have assets, they do not have titles to them. Given titles they can 
borrow against these assets and become more productive. Informed by this hypothesis, many studies 
estimate the effects of titling on credit and other outcomes, but they usually pertain to making assets 
more usable as collateral.11  PLAA went in the opposite direction – it reduced the 
“collateralizability” of land. Using de Soto’s logic it should have made capital less available, 
reducing productivity. We investigate whether it did. 
 Our study of PLAA also contributes to the literature on the origins of developing-country 
legal systems.12  As we will describe, the Raj first decided it would not import English law pertaining 
to property and contract into Punjab. Due to administrative exigencies however, English law did 
become influential over time. PLAA was a bold effort by the Raj itself to turn the clock back, to 
repudiate the importation. 
To identify the effects of PLAA, we assembled a panel dataset on 25 districts in Punjab from 
1890 to 1910. Our dataset contains information on mortgages and sales of land, as well as economic 
outcomes, such as acreage and ownership of cattle, and other relevant variables like rainfall and 
population. Because the PLAA targeted professional moneylenders, it should have reduced 
																																								 																				
10 We discuss various ways of evading the Act in section 4, including falsification of caste (Cassan 2015). 
11 For theoretical discussion of the value of “collateralizability” of land see, for instance, Besley (1995).  While 
papers such as Field (2007) find large positive effects of titling on labor supply in urban Peru, others show that 
titling of land is not a magic bullet and increases access to credit only when certain conditions are met.  For 
instance, it should be possible for the lender to foreclose at moderate cost. Titling may not increase access to 
credit if low-income borrowers are unwilling to part with their most precious asset, land. For surveys of this 
literature see Deininger (2003) and Sanjak (2012). 
12 La Porta et al. (2008). 
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mortgage-backed credit more in places where they were bigger players in the credit market. Hence, 
we interact a measure of the importance of the professional, i.e., non-agricultural, moneylenders in 
the mortgage market with an indicator variable for the introduction of the PLAA, which takes the 
value 1 from 1900 onward. We find, as expected, that PLAA contracted credit more in places where 
professional moneylenders played a larger role— compared to a district with no professional 
moneylenders PLAA reduced mortgage-backed credit by 48 percentage points more at the 25th 
percentile of our measure of moneylender-importance and by 61 percentage points more at the 75th 
percentile.   
 However, this greater contraction of mortgage-backed credit in professional moneylender-
dominated areas did not lead to lower acreage or less ownership of cattle. In short, PLAA affected 
credit markets as we might expect without undermining agricultural productivity. Because we have 
panel data, we are able to account for potential confounding factors such as time-invariant 
unobserved differences across districts (using district fixed effects), common district-specific shocks 
(using year effects) and the possibility that districts were trending differently independent of PLAA 
(using district-specific time trends). Such fixed effects and trends likely control for most omitted 
factors correlated with the interaction of the PLAA indicator variable and our measure of the 
importance of professional moneylenders.  
That said, our econometric approach has one potential limitation. To the extent that PLAA 
had a common effect across Punjab districts, this is absorbed by the year fixed effects, and we cannot 
identify it. Suppose, for instance, PLAA made all lenders (non-agriculturist) or not, reluctant to lend, 
because the government was viewed as hostile to land transfer. The year effects would pick up this 
effect. We should note that as a substantive matter, we do not believe that PLAA discouraged all 
lenders (see below, section 4). 
How do we account for non-responsiveness of real outcomes to a mortgage-backed credit 
contraction? In principle, one possibility is that mortgages did not really decline – they were merely 
disguised as sales. For instance, a 100-rupee loan at a 10% rate of interest could have been disguised 
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as a sale of land for 100 rupees, followed by a repurchase for 110 rupees. This is not likely in our 
context, because the PLAA applied to all “permanent alienations”, including sales. Moreover, we 
show that PLAA also reduced sales more in places where professional moneylenders were more 
active. British officials provided the following explanation for the non-impact of PLAA on 
agricultural production: lenders had merely become more judicious – they were still willing to lend 
for productive activity, but not for “extravagant” expenditures, such as social ceremonies. A more 
general explanation is that though credit was a potential constraint on development, it may not have 
been the binding constraint at the time. In a related paper, Chaudhary and Swamy (2017) studying 
the impact of DARA find similar results: DARA reduced the availability of mortgage-backed credit, 
but had no discernible impact on acreage and cattle ownership. In a similar vein, Cole (2009) finds 
the expansion of credit did not increase agricultural output in independent India.   
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  The next describes the origins of the 
PLAA.   Section 3 describes the Act itself.  We then discuss the qualitative evidence on how the Act 
affected credit and agricultural production in Section 4.  We describe the data and our econometric 
analysis in Sections 5 and 6.  The final section summarizes and concludes. 
2.  Leading up to the Punjab Alienation of Land Act, 1900 
In the mid-19th century, at the point of British conquest of Punjab (1849), land was relatively 
abundant here.  It was not of great value and not widely used as collateral.  It was transferable, but 
members of the village community had the right of first refusal (pre-emption) and “strangers were 
jealously excluded.”13  Caste and village councils (Panchayats) played an important role in village 
governance, including adjudicating disputes.  In regions that the British conquered early (such as 
Bengal and Bombay) they had welcomed the possibility that their rule might lead to socio-economic 
change, in particular that land might change hands from one social group to another.  They 
considered this part of the healthy functioning of a market economy.  This thinking had changed by 
1849.  Punjab was to be governed differently. 
																																								 																				
13 From the Punjab Administrative Report 1849-51, quoted by Barrier (1966), p. 2. 
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 The change in thinking occurred because, earlier in the 19th century, peasants and tribes in 
various parts of India had, sometimes violently, protested exploitation by landlords and 
moneylenders.14 British officials in Punjab also brought to bear their experience in the Northwestern 
Provinces, adjacent to eastern Punjab, and also in parts of Punjab that had been annexed earlier than 
1849. They had come to the conclusion that the fundamental social unit of rural Punjab was the 
brotherhood of landowners in the village. Political and social stability required that this brotherhood 
be preserved. Therefore, they decided that Punjab would be governed not by rigid application of 
English property and contract law, but rather a paternalistic administration that would honor 
“custom.”15 Justice was dispensed by district officers that were given considerable discretion to 
exercise “common sense.”16 The right of pre-emption was recognized -- land could be transferred (for 
sale or for satisfaction of debt) to an outsider only if a suitable buyer could not be found within the 
landowning brotherhood.17 Land taxes were the joint responsibility of the village landowners.    
Despite these efforts to govern Punjab differently, it was not insulated from broader 
processes common to British India. Though land taxes were in principle a joint responsibility of the 
village landowners, they became de facto private obligations, as individuals received titles to specific 
plots with assigned taxes. The Raj collected land taxes in cash, whereas the last pre-colonial regime 
(the Sikhs) had mostly taken produce. This pushed the peasant into market transactions. The Raj 
was also less likely to forgive land taxes in bad times, which pushed peasants into debt. Railroads 
were constructed, and produce could now be sold far from the village. This further facilitated 
involvement in markets, with the accompanying benefits and risks. The Raj constructed canals, 
expanding cultivated area. Population increased. Land prices went up, and it became an attractive 
form of collateral for lenders.   
																																								 																				
14 One example was the Kol rebellion in Chota Nagpur in 1831-32. At one point in the conflict, the rebel army 
consisted of 3000 men.  
15 The administration would be ma-baap, meaning mother-and-father. 
16 Barrier (1966, p. 4) quoting the memoir of a British official. 
17 See Roy and Swamy (2016), p. 67. 
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Even the legal system in Punjab slowly became more formal, like that of the other British 
provinces. A Code of Civil Procedure, passed for the rest of British India in 1859, was extended with 
some modifications to the Punjab in 1866. A Chief Court was set up in Lahore (the capital) in 1866 
and lawyers were now permitted in court. In 1875 the task of dispensing justice was taken away 
from the executive branch of government at the district level. Cases were often adjudicated by lower-
level judicial officers (munsifs), often urban Indians without any particular sympathy for the Punjab 
peasant. The application of law now became more rule-bound, with less room for “equity and good 
conscience”.18 Lenders preferred this system to the village-level panchayats: as shown in table 1 the 
number and proportion of court cases to recover money due increased rapidly. 
 In this setting it was inevitable that some land would pass out of the village community to 
professional moneylenders, especially because in many regions rainfall was low and variable, 
leading to fluctuation in output. This became a worry for the Raj, especially after the Mutiny of 
1857. Punjab had remained loyal to the Raj during the Mutiny and many officials believed this was 
because of the paternalistic and flexible form of governance, which had protected the peasantry. 
Moreover, the Indian army was highly dependent on Punjabi soldiers of peasant origin and the Raj 
wanted their loyalty. Also, Punjab was a border region, and there was always the threat from Russia. 
Finally, in western Punjab Muslim peasants were in debt mostly to Hindu lenders—this could add to 
existing religious tensions on issues like cow protection. All these factors led some officials to raise 
the alarm. 
In the early 1870’s, Justice Melville, a Chief Court judge, called upon the government to re-
examine regulations regarding debt litigation, suggesting that a dispossessed peasant becomes “a 
disaffected and disloyal subject”.19  He suggested several measures including:  “No transfer of land 
																																								 																				
18 This was the rule-of-thumb for exercising discretion. Thorburn 1886, p. 75. 
19 Quoted by Barrier 1965, p. 147. 
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shall be permitted in payment of debt to a creditor.”20  Another officer, C.S. Steedman based in the 
district of Jhang wrote: 
The thrifty and unembarrassed [by debt] zemindars [landowners] of this district can be 
counted on one’s fingers.  So long as a zemindari has credit, so long will he borrow, and so 
long as he borrows shall we find our annual returns of land-transfers slowly, but surely and 
steadily, increasing. 
 
Steedman blamed this on “the misplaced gift of full transferable property right in land to the 
cultivator.”21 
In 1886, S.S. Thorburn, an official with considerable experience in western Punjab, where 
borrowers tended to be Muslim and lenders Hindu, wrote a sensationalist book titled Musalmans and 
Moneylenders. His central hypothesis was as follows.  
The Punjab is an agricultural province, and land of peasant proprietors, a large and annually 
increasing proportion of whom are sinking into the position of serfs to the money-lenders. 
The gradual transfer of ownership of the soil from its natural lords – the cultivators – to 
astute but uninfluential Hindu traders and bankers, is directly due to a system of law and 
administration created by ourselves, which, unless remedied in time, must eventually imperil 
the stability of our hold on the country.22 
 
As a solution he wrote: “I would make it illegal for any person deriving profits from a shop or from 
money-lending, to acquire any interest in pasture or arable land…”  
Other officials opposed the position taken by Melville, Steedman, and Thorburn. Melville’s 
suggestion restricting land transfer was opposed by Lieutenant-Governor Davies on the grounds that 
it would “disturb natural economic relations” and “destroy the habits of self-reliance and industry.” 
His successor, R.E. Egerton was equally sanguine, believing that land transfers were “wholesome 
and necessary.” 23 
The available evidence (see table 2) is ambiguous regarding whether land transfer to 
professional moneylenders was occurring on a massive scale. For instance, in the period 1879-1883, 
just before the publication of Thorburn’s alarmist book, 1.2% of the total area was mortgaged to 
																																								 																				
20 Quoted by Banerjee (1982), p.98, footnote 37. 
21 Thorburn 1886, p. 159. 
22 Thorburn also deployed anti-Semitic stereotypes, arguing that “Shylock was a gentleman by the side of 
Nand Lal Bunniah [bania].” (p.37). 
23 Quoted by Barrier 1965, p. 147-148. 
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“nonagriculturists” and “new agriculturists.” This is not a huge figure, but if it was sustained and a 
large fraction of mortgages led to foreclosure, it could have led to significant changes in the pattern 
of land ownership. The figures are imprecise, because of the ambiguities in the categories of 
“agriculturist” and “non-agriculturist.” However in some specific regions of Punjab  (see table 3), 
professional moneylenders were clearly acquiring a significant fraction of the land. In Gujranwala 
tehsil of Gujranwala district 14% of cultivated area was sold between 1868 and 1891, 60% of which 
was to non-agriculturists.24   
Table 4 suggests that the importance of non-agriculturist lenders was large, but was 
decreasing even prior to the passing of the Act. This suggests PLAA was addressing a “problem” 
that was becoming less significant over time. However, our sense is that the Raj was interested in 
more than Punjab-wide trends. Even if a large amount of land was transferred from traditional 
landowners to professional moneylenders in only a few areas, and this led to only localized protest 
or discontent, this was not a risk the Raj was willing to take. 
 The debate regarding land transfer was never decisively settled within Punjab officialdom.25 
However, the Government of India, in the person of the formidable Viceroy, Lord Curzon, finally 
came down in favor of restrictions on land transfer. The Punjab Alienation of Land Act was passed 
in 1900, to become operational in June 1901. 
3.  The Punjab Land Alienation Act 
As we have described, the purpose of PLAA was to preserve status quo with respect to 
landownership. In particular, the intent was to prevent transfer of land from traditional landowners 
to professional moneylenders, after they defaulted on debt repayment. Therefore, it identified a set of 
social groups as “agricultural tribes” and constrained the terms in which they could mortgage their 
land to someone who was not from an agricultural tribe. The reader should note that, in the context 
of colonial Punjab, the word tribe often effectively meant caste.      
																																								 																				
24 A district consists of several tehsils. 
25 The discussion among officials has been described in detail by van den Dungen (1972). 
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 Only three types of mortgages were permitted. In the first, the lender would take possession 
of the land and use it (usufructuary mortgage) for a maximum of 20 years. After that, the land would 
go back to the borrower and the loan would be extinguished. In the second kind, the borrower 
retained the right to occupy the land but he had to pay rent to the lender. This rent could be no more 
than twice the land tax, plus other dues owed to the government. A conventional mortgage, in 
which the land was used as collateral and remained in the possession of the debtor was also allowed, 
but if the borrower defaulted, the lender could not seize the collateral – he could only apply to the 
Deputy Commissioner, who would convert the agreement into a usufructuary mortgage for a term 
not exceeding twenty years.26 The PLAA also banned, whether or not a member of an agricultural 
tribe was involved, the “conditional sale”, in which the mortgaged land would automatically go to 
the lender if the borrower had not repaid by a specified date. Thus, whatever the form of the 
mortgage, the non-agriculturist lender could not get permanent possession of the agriculturist 
borrower’s land. 
As we have described earlier, for the law to have its intended effect, it also needed to ban 
sales from a member of an agricultural tribe to someone who was not a member. In the absence of 
such a ban it would have been easy to evade the restrictions on mortgages. Therefore, PLAA banned 
all “permanent alienation” from members of agricultural tribes to non-members, with some 
exceptions such as a gift to a religious institution or for charitable purpose.27 
Did PLAA contract mortgage-backed credit and thereby reduce agricultural production?  We 
now turn to qualitative evidence on these questions. 
4. The Impact of PLAA on Credit and Agricultural Production:  Qualitative Evidence 
 The consensus among British officials was that PLAA discouraged lending by professional 
moneylenders. According to an official report from 1903, there was “no doubt” that the Act had 
																																								 																				
26 Douie (1931). 
27 Singh (1901), p. 14. 
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“contracted the credit of zemindars” except in some rich districts.28 A judge in Ambala, a South-
eastern district in present-day Haryana commented: “Every year brings it home more forcibly to the 
money-lender that he must seek new investment for his capital, and in this district there appears to 
be some advance towards industrial enterprise on the part of the capitalists.”29 Modern scholars like 
Norman Barrier have argued that the Government of India’s objective of “checking of land transfer 
outside the agricultural community” was “instantly fulfilled.”30 Still, we cannot be certain that 
mortgage-backed credit declined in places where professional moneylenders were active, because, (a) 
the Act may have been evaded; and (b) if the professional moneylenders withdrew, other lenders 
may have stepped in. We discuss four possibilities, below. 
 First, a professional moneylender could pretend to belong to an agricultural caste. Cassan 
(2015) has shown, using census data, that after PLAA was passed, the population of self-reported 
agricultural castes began to grow faster. He estimates that as many as 7.5% of non-agricultural caste 
persons pretended to be from agricultural castes. To the extent professional moneylenders adopted 
this strategy, they could have continued to lend as before. 
 Second, it is possible that after the PLAA was passed richer members of agricultural castes 
started to lend more. The evidence in Table 4 is consistent with this claim, though the increase in the 
proportion of mortgage lending by agriculturists after 1900 is small. Moreover, given Cassan’s 
findings, we must be particularly skeptical of the accuracy of the distinction between agriculturist 
and non-agriculturist lenders after 1900.  
Third, it was possible for a lender from a non-agricultural caste to lend with the help of an 
associate who was a member of an agricultural caste. The latter would, only on paper, be the lender 
and mortgagee. Such transactions in another person’s name, known as benami, were and are 
common in India and the government is still trying to stamp them out. Islam (1995) has argued that 
the professional moneylenders used benami extensively, allowing them to remain active in the 
																																								 																				
28 Annual Report on the Working of the Punjab Alienation of Land Act for the year ending 1902, p. 14. 
29 Punjab, Report on Civil Justice, 1909, p. 2. 
30 Barrier (1965, p. 191).  
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mortgage market. Again, to the extent this argument applies, the figures in table 4 are misleading, 
because some of the mortgages reported as due to agriculturists were really from non-agriculturists. 
A fourth response involved the use of the right of pre-emption. We have seen earlier that 
when a piece of land was transferred in a village, other landowners in the village had the right of first 
refusal. One way for a professional moneylender, who already owned some land in a village to 
acquire more, was to persuade a member of an agricultural caste to try to transfer the land to 
someone outside the village. The professional moneylender could then pre-empt.31 The Punjab Pre-
Emption Act was amended in 1905 to eliminate this possibility.    
Given extensive efforts to evade the PLAA, as well as the potential for substitution of 
professional moneylenders by rich peasant moneylenders, its impact on mortgage-backed credit 
remains an open question. How did PLAA affect agricultural production? British officials were 
sanguine, believing that credit had contracted, but this had merely curbed peasant extravagance – 
credit was still available to support agricultural production. The official view, reiterated repeatedly, 
was laid out in the Annual Report on the Working of the Alienation of Land Act, 1903.32 
The general conclusions arrived at as to the working of the Act… agree with the Lieutenant-
Governor’s own enquiries during his tours of the province. Sir Charles Rivaz thinks that it 
may be safely asserted that the Act has achieved its main objective of placing material checks 
on alienation of land without unduly impairing agricultural credit….while it has had a 
highly beneficial effect in the direction of curbing the natural proneness of the Punjabi 
zamindar to habits of profuse extravagance. 
 
We turn next to using district-level credit and economic data to evaluate the effects of PLAA.  
 
5. Data and Estimation Strategy 
 
5.1 Data           
 To estimate the effects of PLAA, we construct a panel dataset of colonial Punjab districts 
using multiple sources from 1890 to 1910.33 Our dataset follows a panel of 25 districts for 21 years 
covering ten years before PLAA and eleven years after PLAA. Although PLAA was officially 
																																								 																				
31 Annual Report, 1902, p. 14.   
32 Annual Report 1903 (published 1904), p. 3. 
33 1890 = 1890/91. 
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implemented in 1901, we turn on our indicator for the law in 1900 when it was passed. That said, 
our results are similar if we use 1901 as the start-date. Colonial Punjab in this period undergoes a 
few boundary changes. First, a new province, the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), was 
created in 1901. We focus on Punjab proper where PLAA was passed in 1900. Second, we construct 
two super districts with consistent boundaries in our period. The first is Jhang, which includes the 
district of Lyallpur carved out of Jhang in 1904. The second is an aggregation of Attock, Jhelum and 
Rawalpindi because Attock was carved from parts of Jhelum and Rawalpindi. We exclude the 
Punjab district of Mianwali because Bannu district was carved from Mianwali and included with 
NWFP after 1901.  
Using the annual Notes on the Registration Returns of the Punjab, we construct the number and 
aggregate value of mortgages and sales over Rs. 100 for each district. For these transactions 
registration was compulsory. We do not use figures for transactions worth less then Rs. 100, because 
registration of these was optional. The series over Rs.100 is consistent and numerically dominant.. 
Mortgages over Rs. 100 represent 81% of the total number of mortgages across districts and 96% of 
the aggregate value of mortgages across districts. To measure economic outcomes, we use the 
annual Agricultural Statistics of British India series on total cropped acreage, cattle, ploughs, and carts 
for each district. Unlike the acreage data, the livestock, ploughs and carts series are only reported for 
1896, 1897, 1898, 1903 and 1908.  
Our control variables include the share of professional moneylenders, total rainfall and 
population. We rely on figures in the Registration Report for 1899-1900 to construct a measure of 
the importance of professional moneylenders, i.e., the share of non-agricultural moneylenders in 
mortgage and sale transactions in each district in 1899 just before the law is passed.34 Since PLAA 
would likely affect the proportion of non-agricultural moneylenders after its passage, we construct 
																																								 																				
34  Let A = Number of mortgages and sales of agricultural land from “old” to “new” agriculturists; B = Number of 
mortgages and sales of land from “old” agriculturists to “old” agriculturists.  Our measure of the importance of the 





this variable in the year before PLAA.        
 We use the Punjab Land Revenue reports to collect information on total rainfall from1890 to 
1899. And, we use the Season and Crop reports for rainfall data in the 1900s. For two years, 1900 
and 1910, our data are from Rainfall of India, an annual publication of the Meteorological 
Department of the Government of India. In the regressions, we average rainfall in years t, and t-1 
because rainfall affects sowing that often occurs early in the agricultural season.  
To measure annual population we use the Sanitary Reports and census data. We begin with 
the 1891 census population in each district. Then, we add annual births and subtract annual deaths 
from the Sanitary Reports to arrive at annual population from 1891 to 1910. Some scholars have 
noted the general problem of under-enumeration in the Sanitary Reports. Despite this shortcoming, 
we believe population counts constructed from the Sanitary Reports are better than using an 
interpolated census series because we only have three census years (1891, 1901, and 1911).  
Table 5 presents the summary statistics. On average, there are 1680 mortgages across 
districts compared to 933 sales. But, the difference in aggregate value of mortgages is smaller. The 
aggregate value of mortgages average 870,000 rupees compared to 648,000 rupees for sales. Total 
cropped acreage averages  just over 2 million acres with large differences across districts. We also 
observe large differences in the case of cattle, ploughs and carts across Punjab districts. Total rainfall 
averages 29 inches per year, ranging from a low of 3 to a high of 179 inches. In 1899, professional 
moneylenders i.e., non-agricultural moneylenders account for an average of 54% of mortgage and 
sale transactions (see note 35) with substantial variation across districts, ranging from 36% to 74%. It 
is likely this proportion declined after the PLAA.  
Figures 1 and 2 plot the average number and aggregate value of mortgages and sales over Rs. 
100 from 1890 to 1910. There are steep declines in the number and aggregate value of mortgages 
following the passage of PLAA. While the value of mortgages recovers over time, the number of 
mortgages remains below their pre-1900 levels for the entire decade. Such patterns are especially 
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striking because the 1900s was a period of growth for the Indian economy, especially in Punjab on 
account of more irrigation and the settling of the Canal Colonies (which we discuss below). Indeed, 
the summary picture likely underestimates the decline in mortgage credit caused by PLAA. Sales 
also decline but the aggregate value of sales increases after an initial decline immediately after the 
PLAA. To control for the effects of a growing economy, we turn next to the formal econometric 
analysis that allows us to control for temporal factors. 
4.2 Empirical Strategy 
 To identify the effects of PLAA, we estimate the following model: 
𝑌!" = 𝛼! + 𝛿! + 𝛽𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐴! ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑀𝐿! + 𝜆! ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 + 𝜓𝑋!" + 𝜀!" 
𝑌!"  is an outcome in district 𝑖 in year 𝑡. 𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐴! is an indicator, which turns to one when PLAA is 
passed in 1900 (and remains one thereafter) and is zero otherwise. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑀𝐿! is the proportion of 
land mortgage and sale transactions in which the mortgagee or buyer is a professional moneylender 
in a district as of 1899, just before the passage of PLAA. Since PLAA is passed in all districts of 
colonial Punjab, we cannot include the PLAA indicator variable along with year fixed effects.35 
Using the interaction term allows us to use year fixed effects and still identify the heterogeneous 
effects of PLAA. Districts in which professional moneylenders had a larger role should have 
experienced a greater decline in credit following PLAA. This is akin to a difference-in-difference 
estimation as we are comparing districts with more professional moneylenders to those with fewer 
professional moneylenders before and after the passage of PLAA.  
The district fixed effects, 𝛼!, control for unobservable time-invariant characteristics of 
districts and year fixed effects, 𝛿!, control for temporal changes, such as an improving macro-
economy, that influence all districts in the same manner. In addition, we include district time trends 
to control for district-specific changes over time due to factors we cannot observe. In regressions 
where we have data for a smaller number of years such as for cattle and implements, we do not 
																																								 																				
35 This would lead to perfect multicollinearity. 
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include the trends. The vector, 𝑋!" , includes as controls average rainfall, its square, population and its 
square. To address concerns regarding serial correlation, we cluster the standard errors at the district-
level.  
Most laws are passed with a few years or months of preceding discussion, which can affect 
outcomes even before formal legislation.. To assess the role of such dynamics, we present dynamic 
results including indicators for the 3-year window before PLAA, a 3-year window immediately after 
PLAA was passed and a long run window for years 4 and beyond. For example, if the law is passed 
in year 0, these indicators correspond to pre-PLAA (year -3, -2 and -1), short-run PLAA (year 0, 1 




We begin with simple before and after regressions showing the effect of PLAA on mortgage 
credit and sales in Table 6.  Here we include district fixed effects, a district-specific trend and the 
average rainfall and population controls. In specifications (1) and (2), the PLAA coefficient is large, 
negative and significant for both the number and aggregate value of mortgages. PLAA reduces the 
number of mortgages by 59% (exp(-0.902) – 1) and the aggregate value of mortgages by 60%. These 
are substantial effects. We observe declines in sales in specifications (3) and (4), but they are smaller 
in magnitudes.  The number of sales declines by 19% and their aggregate value by 21%. Some British 
officials worried about PLAA leading to more loans disguised as sales. But these findings suggest if 
anything sales also declined (compared to trend) after PLAA. 
In specifications (5) through (8), we study the dynamics of PLAA. Controlling for 
anticipation effects of the law does not change the picture. PLAA has a significant short-run effect of 
59% and a long-run effect of 65% on the number of mortgages with larger effects on the value of 
mortgages. Similar to specifications (3) and (4), the decline in sales after PLAA are smaller. Overall, 




Including district-specific trends controls for linear temporal changes in table 6, but it does 
not account for common year-specific shocks. So in table 7 we turn to our preferred specification, 
which tests for heterogeneous effects of PLAA in districts with more or less active professional 
moneylenders, while including district fixed effects, year fixed effects, and district-specific time 
trends. We focus on the interaction between PLAA and our measure of the role of professional, i.e., 
non-agricultural, moneylenders in specifications (1) to (4). We then explore the dynamic effects 
including interactions of non-agricultural moneylenders with pre-PLAA, short-run and long-run 
PLAA indicators in specifications (5) to (8).  
We find significant differential declines in mortgage credit. At the 25th percentile of our 
professional moneylenders’ importance measure (46%), the number of mortgages declines by 46 
percentage points more than a district where there are no professional moneylenders. The 
corresponding figure at the 75th percentile of moneylender importance (61%) is 56 percentage points. 
Thus, moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile of professional moneylenders’ share reduces 
mortgage credit by 10 percentage points. We find similar effects for the aggregate value of mortgages 
in specification (2). Unlike mortgages, we find small and insignificant coefficients on the interaction 
term for sales. We find similar results on the dynamics in specifications (5) to (8). Coefficients on the 
post-PLAA and proportion non-agricultural moneylender interactions are large, negative and 
significant compared to those on the pre-PLAA and proportion non-agricultural moneylender 
interactions for mortgage credit. And, we find no significant differential declines in sales after 
PLAA.36  
It is possible that PLAA played out somewhat differently in Punjab’s famous Canal 
Colonies. In the South-Western Punjab, only the river valleys were cultivated. Between the rivers 
there were uplands (bar), which were sparsely populated with largely nomadic population. 
																																								 																				
36 In an additional robustness check, we interacted the PLAA dummy with the rural population share. Since the Act 
applied to transactions between agricultural and non-agricultural tribes, we would expect to observe more negative 
effects of PLAA in more rural districts. And, this is what we find with larger magnitudes for mortgages than sales. 
These results are available upon request.  
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Beginning in 1886, the Raj constructed a series of canals, bringing 2.5 million acres of bar under 
cultivation by 1914.37 Settlers were brought in from densely populated areas such as central Punjab.  
Because of the special circumstances the Canal Colonies had an “anomalous place in the Punjab 
administrative structure”.38  The Colonization Officer had enormous power. Also, in the Lower 
Chenab Colony (1893), the largest of them all, a category of grantees known as “peasants” only 
received a tenancy right, not a transferable ownership right, precisely to avoid the problem of land 
loss to moneylenders.39 So we need to check whether excluding the Canal Colonies changes our 
results.40 
Table 8 estimates the same specifications as in Table 7, but excludes the canal colony 
districts. Similar to Table 7, we find large differential declines in mortgage credit and no significant 
differential declines in sales. Canal colonies are not driving the effects we observe on PLAA. If 
anything, the coefficients are very similar. Moving from the 25th percentile of the professional 
moneylenders’ distribution to the 75th percentile, PLAA reduces the number of mortgages by 9.9 
percentage points more.   
We turn to agricultural outcomes in table 9. Here, we find no significant coefficients on the 
interaction term for most outcomes—acreage, cattle, cattle per acre and ploughs. If anything, we 
find a positive effect of PLAA on carts. However, it is marginally significant at the 10 percent level. 
For the other outcomes, the coefficient on PLAA and the interaction term are positive and 
insignificant. Thus, although we find large and negative effects of PLAA on mortgage-backed credit 
in districts with more professional moneylenders, we find no corresponding negative effects on real 
outcomes.   
Our results show that mortgage credit declined substantially more in areas where 
professional moneylenders were a relatively large part of the mortgage market. Is it possible that our 
																																								 																				
37 Douie 1914, p. 612. 
38 Barrier (1967), p. 359. 
39 The other two categories of land recipients, who got more land, were known as yeomen and capitalists. 
40 Ibid, p. 616. 
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results are misleading, and driven by the fact that mortgages were disguised as other types of 
transactions? We have ruled out loans disguised as sales, but another way to disguise the mortgage 
was as a land lease – the “tenant” was the lender and his “rent” was the loan. The PLAA tried to 
discourage this by allowing a lease for a maximum of 20 years if the landlord was a member of an 
agricultural tribe and the tenant was not.41 A land transfer could also be passed off as a gift for 
charity or to a religious institution. Official reports commented on these subterfuges, but noted the 
small number of gifts and leases, and the absence of any significant increase in their number after 
PLAA was passed. They concluded that leases and gifts were not significantly affecting the 
operation of PLAA.   
Table 10 provides support for this view. Between1899-1900, the last full fiscal year before the 
Act came into being, and the 1901-02, the first full fiscal year when the Act was in place, the number 
of mortgages of immoveable property fell from 53,754 to 23, 276 and sales from 29,552 to 19,098. 
The number of gifts barely changed, from 1,069 to 1,011, and the number of leases fell from 1,869 to 
1,367. Subsequent figures are for calendar years. By 1910 gifts only increased to 1,220 and leases to 
2,114. Meanwhile mortgages recovered to 39,934 and sales to 25, 5011.   
A potential reason why the contraction of mortgage-backed credit did not affect production 
outcomes is that mortgages were a small fraction of the aggregate credit market. However, the 
available evidence does not support this hypothesis. In 1918-19, Malcolm Darling, a British 
administrator who authored a famous book on colonial Punjab, commissioned a survey of 
borrowing by 55,308 members of cooperative societies in Punjab. Darling provided figures for “net 
mortgage debt”. This differed from gross mortgage debt in that if a person was both mortgager and 
mortgagee, the difference between the amounts involved in the former and the latter would be the 
net mortgage. Darling estimated that net mortgage debt was 40% of total debt. It was relatively high 
in Jullundur and Hoshiarpur (more than 60%), 37% in the northern districts of Rawalpindi, Jhelum, 
and Attock, and below 30% in the Southern districts of Rohtak, Karnal, and Hissar. These figures 
																																								 																				
41 Singh 1901 p. 33. 
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are for a slightly later time period than our study, but since PLAA reduced mortgages we are 
confident that they were an important fraction of the total credit market during 1890-1910.42 
This leaves us with the explanation offered by British officials: the primary impact of PLAA 
was to reduce expenditures on social ceremonies, hence there was no impact on production 
outcomes. For this conjecture to be plausible, there should be evidence of substantial expenditure on 
social ceremonies. In 1895 the Punjab government commissioned S.S. Thorburn, whose concerns 
regarding land alienation we have already discussed, to conduct a household survey of peasant 
indebtedness and land alienation in Rawalpindi division. His mandate was to pick areas where 
peasants were most indebted to non-agriculturists and had lost the most land. He picked 12 villages, 
three each in four “circles” (administrative units used land revenue assignment). Two of the circles 
were in Shahpur district and the other two in Sialkot and Gujranwala. He surveyed 742 households 
in detail. The percentage of debt due to expenditures on marriages and funerals in the four circles 
was 8, 8, 12 and 9. By way of comparison, the percentages of debt for the purchase of cattle were 10, 
12, 15, and 8. Thus marriage and funeral expenses were substantial. The argument that productive 
expenditures were maintained by reducing these expenses is at least plausible.43 
7. Conclusion 
While much of the literature on India and other developing countries has focused on (lack 
of) access to credit as a constraint on development, another point of view has emphasized the need 
for appropriate allocation of capital. Anjini Kochar (2011) has shown that subsidized credit provided 
by the Government of India in 1980s, which was poorly allocated, had little impact on poverty. 
Also, as mentioned earlier, Cole (2009) found no evidence that subsidized agricultural credit had 
raised productivity, and Chaudhary and Swamy (2017) find that the Deccan Agriculturists’ Relief 
Act produced outcomes similar to those we have discussed here: it reduced the availability of 
mortgage-backed credit, but had no discernible effect on cropped acreage or investment in cattle. 
																																								 																				
42 Darling (1947), p. 6. 
43 Thorburn (1896), p. 17.  Marriages accounted for the bulk of the “unproductive” expenditures – funerals were 
only 1% in all four circles. 
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Our findings are consistent with the claims of British officials, who claimed that PLAA had 
not reduced lending for production but moneylenders had cut back on loans for social ceremonies 
and the like. These officials were echoing present-day theoretical work which suggests that lenders 
allocate capital better when they have more “skin in the game” i.e. the collateral is not so good that 
they do not have to worry about default (Manove et al. 1999). A report on the operation of PLAA 
made exactly this point: “The village sahukar [moneylender] has now to exercise discrimination in 
selecting his clients and in fixing the amount of his advances. He can no longer lend with apparent 
recklessness confident that his advances will be more than repaid in land.”44 Another official did not 
doubt that “there will always be in the village banias [professional moneylenders] enough to finance 
the zamindars to the extent of their legitimate needs as peasants.” However, the banias would now 
have available for other investment money the peasants had “previously frittered away in 
unproductive expenditure.”45 
 Though our study of the PLAA has focused on its short-term impact on credit markets and 
productivity, we should, before concluding, note other potentially long-term consequences. 
Historians like Ian Talbot (1988) have argued that the PLAA had an important impact on the 
politics of pre-Partition Punjab. Though it provoked the predominantly Hindu moneylenders, it 
helped bring together Muslim and Hindu landowners in the Unionist Party, during a period in 
which Hindu-Muslim tension was growing.46 
We should also recognize that while the PLAA presented itself as protective legislation, it 
also had an exclusionary aspect. While it may have prevented some landowners from becoming 
landless, it also prevented landless castes, who were not classified as agricultural tribes, from 
acquiring land. After the Partition, PLAA was declared unconstitutional in independent India.  
																																								 																				
44 Annual Report 1905-06, p. 8. 
45Ibid, p. 8. 
46 As a result, the Muslim League gained influence in Punjab much later than in United Provinces. 
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However it remained law in Pakistani Punjab, where some scholars have argued it has helped 
perpetuate caste-based hierarchy.47 
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Table 6: Did PLAA Affect Outcomes? A Before and After Comparison 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 











Mortgages # Sales 
Value 
Sales 
    
       PLAA  (0/1) -0.902*** -0.917*** -0.213*** -0.236*** 
    
 
(0.068) (0.082) (0.043) (0.049) 
    Pre-PLAA (year -3, -2, -1) 
    
-0.021 -0.155*** -0.023 -0.073 
     
(0.049) (0.050) (0.043) (0.050) 
PLAA, Short Run 
    
-0.912*** -1.043*** -0.227*** -0.293*** 
     
(0.083) (0.100) (0.056) (0.075) 
PLAA, Long Run 
    
-1.047*** -1.129*** -0.338*** -0.381*** 
     
(0.112) (0.126) (0.072) (0.086) 
         District FE, District Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Rainfall and Pop. Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         Observations 525 525 525 525 525 525 525 525 
                  
Robust standard errors clustered at the district-level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
    
PLAA is an indicator for the Punjab Land Alienation Act that turns to 1 in 1900. All regressions include average rainfall and its squared, population and its squared, 
district fixed effects, and district specific trends.  
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Table 7: Differences-in-Differences, PLAA and Professional Moneylenders 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 











Mortgages # Sales 
Ag. Value 
Sales 
                  
Prop. Non-Ag ML*PLAA -1.346** -1.728*** -0.321 -0.190 
    
 
(0.532) (0.587) (0.469) (0.513) 
    Prop. Non-Ag ML*Pre-
PLAA (year -3, -2, -1) 
    
-0.309 -0.647* 0.490 0.339 
     
(0.286) (0.322) (0.391) (0.326) 
Prop. Non-Ag ML*PLAA, 
Short Run 
    
-1.540** -2.262*** 0.151 0.184 
     
(0.604) (0.597) (0.504) (0.611) 
Prop. Non-Ag ML*PLAA, 
Long Run 
    
-2.503*** -2.676*** -0.396 -0.790 
     
(0.887) (0.886) (0.686) (0.696) 
         Observations 504 504 504 504 504 504 504 504 
                  
Robust standard errors clustered at the district-level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
    
PLAA is an indicator for the Punjab Land Alienation Act that turns to 1 in 1900. Prop. Non-Ag ML is the proportion of non-agriculturist moneylenders, i.e. professional 
moneylenders.  All regressions include average rainfall and its squared, population and its squared, district fixed effects, year fixed effects, and district specific trends.  
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Table 8: Differences-in-Differences, PLAA and Professional Moneylenders - NO CANAL COLONIES 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 











Mortgages # Sales 
Ag. Value 
Sales 
                  
Prop. Non-Ag ML*PLAA -1.669** -1.885** -0.072 -0.204 
    
 
(0.645) (0.762) (0.696) (0.714) 
    Prop. Non-Ag ML*Pre-PLAA 
(year -3, -2, -1) 
    
-0.228 -0.159 0.532 0.476 
     
(0.291) (0.343) (0.354) (0.346) 
Prop. Non-Ag ML*PLAA, 
Short Run 
    
-1.843** -2.000** 0.399 0.243 
     
(0.716) (0.877) (0.762) (0.776) 
Prop. Non-Ag ML*PLAA, 
Long Run 
    
-2.226* -2.368* 0.285 -0.244 
     
(1.212) (1.188) (1.075) (0.987) 
         Observations 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 378 
                  
Robust standard errors clustered at the district-level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
    PLAA is an indicator for the Punjab Land Alienation Act that turns to 1 in 1900. Prop. Non-Ag ML is the proportion of non-agriculturist moneylenders, i.e. 
professional moneylenders.  All regressions include average rainfall and its squared, population and its squared, district fixed effects, year fixed effects, and district 
specific trends.  
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Table 9: Differential Effect of PLAA on Real Outcomes 
 





Area Cattle Cattle/Area Ploughs Carts 
      Prop. Non-Ag ML*PLAA 0.048 0.380 -0.519 0.386 1.482* 
 
(0.134) (0.284) (0.382) (0.256) (0.815) 
      District-Trend Yes No No No No 
      Observations 504 120 115 118 120 
            
Robust standard errors clustered at the district-level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
PLAA is an indicator for the Punjab Land Alienation Act that turns to 1 in 1900. Prop. Non-Ag ML is the proportion of non-agriculturist moneylenders, 




Table 10:  Number of Sales, Mortgages, Leases and Gifts of 
Immoveable Property, Punjab, 1899-1910 










     1899-1900 1,069 1,869 29,552 53,754 
1900-01 1,071 1,405 31,675 45,398 
1901-02 1,011 1,367 19,098 23,276 
1902 1,044 1,533 20,436 25,872 
1903 1,118 1,547 21,320 29,410 
1904 1,206 1,711 22,807 30,667 
1905 1,219 1,569 23,658 29,776 
1906 1,279 1,682 26,294 38,442 
1907 1,210 1,600 23,530 32,523 
1908 1,216 1,716 26,139 40,034 
1909 1,366 1,810 28,224 44,913 
1910 1,220 2,114 25,011 39,934 
          
Source: From Punjab Registration Report.  These data pertain to transactions for 
which registration was compulsory.  For sales and mortgages this was the case if 
the amount was greater than 100 rupees. Data for the first three years are for fiscal 
years 1899-1900, 1900-01, 1901-02. 
	
